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Abstract: Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a complex disorder characterised by self-
starvation, an act of self-destruction. It is often described as a disorder marked by 
paradoxes and, despite extensive research attention, is still not well understood. 
Much AN research focuses upon the distorted body image that individuals with AN 
supposedly experience. However, based upon reports from individuals describing 
their own experience of AN, I argue that their bodily experience is much more 
complex than this focus might lead us to believe. Such research often presents an 
overly cognitive understanding of bodily experience in AN, underplaying the 
affective, felt experience of individuals with AN, as well as descriptions of 
empowerment, strength and control reported in the early stages of AN. This paper 
seeks to enrich our understanding of bodily experience in AN as it progresses 
throughout the various stages of the disorder. I show how the classical 
phenomenological distinction between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object, 
as well as Leder’s conception of the visceral body, can inform our understanding of 
bodily experience in AN. I suggest that the project of self-starvation is an attempt to 
overcome the noisy demands of the visceral body, which are experienced as 
threatening the body-as-subject, through a process of objectifying the body-as-
object. By cashing out AN as a project of radical bodily control that, tragically, comes 
to control the individual, we can capture important aspects of the bodily experience 
of AN and the temporal progression of the disorder.  
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Introduction  
Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a complex disorder characterised by self-starvation, an act 
of self-destruction. It is often described as a disorder marked by paradoxes (Leder 
2013) and, despite extensive research attention, is still not well understood. One of 
the central characteristics associated with AN is the idea that individuals with AN 
experience distorted body image, typically, in terms of judging or perceiving their 
body as larger than it in fact is. Indeed, suffering from distorted body image is one of 
the diagnostic criteria for AN and is influential in how AN is conceived both 
academically and in the media; we are all familiar with images of a painfully thin 
woman peering into a mirror that shows an obese figure staring back at her. As Cash 
& Brown (1987, p.487) put it, “this alone is suggestive of how common the belief is 
that perceptual distortion of body image is a hallmark of the disorder”. 
This paper suggests, however, that experiencing distorted body image does 
not exhaustively nor, in many cases, accurately, reflect the bodily experience of 
individuals with AN and privileges a third-person perspective of the disorder at the 
expense of first-person accounts. This not only hinders our understanding of AN but 
our lack of insight into the condition has therapeutic implications; AN is a potentially 
lethal disorder and, as yet, we have no consensus on the best way to treat patients 
suffering from it.  
In this paper, I draw on first-person reports of individuals with AN, drawing out 
the reoccurring themes of experiencing their body as something volatile, threatening 
and demanding that needs to be controlled.i I suggest that the phenomenology of 
embodiment, with its multi-dimensional account of bodily experience, offers 
illuminating insights to a study of AN based upon reports of bodily experience. By 
introducing a multi-layered account of embodiment, we can begin to understand how 
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individuals with AN attempt to achieve a radical form of subjective embodiment 
through a radical project of bodily control.  
In section 1, I provide a brief summary of AN, note that experiencing distorted 
body image is taken to be a central feature AN and outline why placing distorted 
body image at the centre of our understanding of AN is, at best, misleading and, at 
worst, a mischaracterization of the disorder as a ‘disease of thinness’. Section 2 
introduces key descriptions of bodily experience in AN. This overview highlights the 
role of control, power and bodily suspicion that are at play in the disorder. In 
particular, it reveals how an individual with AN does not experience herii body simply 
as an overly large, inert, heavy object, but as a noisy, disruptive subject that 
threatens her own agency. This overview also brings to the fore that AN is not a 
static disorder but one that has numerous stages (Warin 2004, 2010). Based on this 
picture of the lived bodily experience of AN, I suggest that what an account of AN 
needs to capture is how self-starvation, an act of self-destruction, can be understood 
as a project of control, power and self-preservation, that often tragically subverts 
leaving the individual at the mercy of their own project.  
It should be noted that I predominantly draw upon Hornbacher’s memoir in 
this paper. There are, of course, limitations to drawing upon one individual’s account 
of a disorder. However, the advantage of doing so is that we can track Hornbacher’s 
extensive and detailed description of her experience. I use Hornbacher’s 
descriptions to illustrate various themes that consistently resurface in reports of AN 
(e.g. in reports collected by or reported in: Bowden 2012, Bruch 1978, Halban 2009, 
Katzman & Lee 1997, Legrand 2010a,b, MacSween 1993, and Warin 2004, 2010). 
As such, these themes, while not exhaustive of bodily experience of AN, can be 
viewed as, at least, common and worthy of attention.  
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Section 3 sets out how phenomenological descriptions of bodily experience 
help us understand how a conflict between different dimensions of bodily experience 
might arise. Specifically, I draw on the classic phenomenological distinction between 
body-as-object and body-as-subject, as well as Leder’s often-overlooked notion of 
the visceral body. In section 4, I explore the idea that the lived experience of an 
individual with AN involves feeling her body as radically objectified, as claimed by 
Bowden (2012). I suggest that the limitation of this approach is that it does not fully 
capture why the individual experiences her body as threatening. I offer a revised 
phenomenological account claiming that an individual with AN does not simply 
experience her body as objectified but embarks upon a project of objectifying the 
body, via self-starvation, in order to control the demands of the physical body. 
Finally, in section 5, I outline some therapeutic implications of my account. 
 
1. AN and distorted body image  
1.1. Diagnostic criteria  
AN is classified as an eating disorder by the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA). It is characterized by self-starvation that leads to dramatic weight loss. The 
diagnostic criteria for AN, as set out in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) (APA 2013a), are as follows:  
i) a persistent restriction of energy intake leading to significantly low body 
weight (in context of what is minimally expected for age, sex, developmental 
trajectory, and physical health);  
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ii) either an intense fear of gaining weight or of becoming fat, or persistent 
behaviour that interferes with weight gain (even though significantly low 
weight); and  
iii) a disturbance in the way one's body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body shape and weight on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of 
recognition of the seriousness of the current low body weight. 
About 1% of the general populace is diagnosed with AN and 9 out of 10 of sufferers 
are female (Hudson et al. 2007). AN is believed to have the highest mortality rate of 
any psychiatric disorder, with research suggesting that approximately 5.5% of 
individuals diagnosed with AN die as a result of their condition (Arcelus et al. 2011). 
As yet, there is little consensus among medical professionals about the best way to 
treat AN. Among the dominant forms of treatment is hospitalisation and in-patient 
treatment for weight gain. However, there is a high relapse rate; Carter et al. (2004) 
report that approximately 35% of individuals relapse within 2 years of leaving in-
patient treatment.  
AN has attracted much attention in both medical and academic circles and a 
plethora of theories have been offered, including: biological (e.g. Crisp 1988), 
psychological (e.g. Freud 1958), feminist (e.g. Bordo 1992; Orbach 1978), religious 
(e.g. Richards et al. 2007) and, more recently, phenomenological (e.g. Bowden 
2012; Legrand 2010a, 2010b; Rodemeyer, forthcoming; Svenaeus 2013). In many 
ways, these assorted approaches to AN reflect the multidimensional nature of the 
disorder.  
Due to the complexity of the disorder, I, like many others (e.g. Krueger & 
Osler, forthcoming; Legrand 2010b; Rodemeyer, forthcoming), endorse a pluralistic 
approach to AN. As such, my focus on a disruption of bodily experience should not 
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be mistaken for a denial that other factors are at play. Rather, I follow researchers 
who have sought to draw attention to the affective, visceral bodily experience of 
individuals with AN (e.g. Bowden 2012; Legrand 2010a, b; Charland et al. 2013; 
Svenaeus 2013), that goes beyond the assertion that they suffer ‘a disturbance in 
the way one's body weight or shape is experienced’ as the DSM-V suggests. My 
analysis, therefore, aims to provide a more fine-grained, phenomenological account 
of the bodily experience of AN and considers the therapeutic implications of this 
approach.  
 
1.2. Distorted body image 
Distorted body image is typically treated as involving an overestimation of body parts 
or body size (Garner and Garfinkel 1981); either in terms of having a faulty 
perception of one’s body or forming flawed judgments about one’s body. The 
assumption is that subjects without AN accurately perceive their bodies and/or form 
positive or neutral judgments about their body size. In contrast, those with AN are 
described as having altered perceptions of or negative judgments about their bodies 
that are at odds with their anatomical size; individuals with AN are thought to 
perceive or judge themselves to be fat when they are, in fact, drastically 
underweight.  
To date, perhaps the most commonly agreed upon feature of AN is that it: 
involves “a disturbance of body image of delusional proportions” (Bruch 1962, 
p.188). While Bruch (1962) was the first to postulate distorted body image as the 
hallmark of AN, the importance given to distorted body image is reflected in the 
sheer number of questionnaires and studies developed to try and measure distorted 
body image in AN (see Cash & Brown 1987 and Cash & Pruzinsky 2004 for an 
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overview of these various techniques), as well as the preponderance of therapy 
aimed at righting distorted body image (e.g. Thompson et al. 2001; Key et al. 2001; 
Vocks et al. 2010).iii  
Indeed, this notion of distorted body image is so prevalent that it is built into 
the DSM-V definition of AN, which states that AN involves “a disturbance in the way 
one's body weight or shape is experienced” (APA 2013a). This is even more explicit 
in the APA fact sheet on eating disorders which claims that “[a]norexia nervosa, 
which primarily affects adolescent girls and young women, is characterized by 
distorted body image and excessive dieting that leads to severe weight loss” (APA 
2013b, my emphasis). What is more, distorted body image is widely reinforced by 
images of individuals with AN found in the media. As Warin (2004) wryly notes, we 
are all familiar with the depiction of AN as a skeletal female figure staring into a 
mirror that reflects her as overweight.  
Notwithstanding the emphasis on distorted body image in AN research, I suggest 
that there are three reasons why we should treat this conception of the bodily 
experience of individuals with AN with reservation. Namely that:  
i) scientific evidence about distorted body image in AN is inconclusive; 
ii) the focus on body image in AN privileges a third-person perspective 
fascinated by thinness; and  
iii) this approach fails to give proper attention to individuals’ complex lived bodily 
experience of AN.   
Despite extensive scientific research into distorted body image in patients with 
AN, results do not currently provide a coherent picture about the alteration of body 
image in AN. Some researchers claim that body image distortion is a common 
feature of AN (e.g. Garner & Garfinkel 1977; Fairburn & Harrison 2003). However, 
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such findings have been called into question on the basis that “many studies have 
failed to demonstrate a significant difference in overestimation between eating 
disordered patients and non-eating disordered controls” (Dolan et. al 1987, p.513; 
see also Delinsky 2011; Hennighausen et al. 1999). There have been few studies 
that have explicitly looked at body image in non-pathological cases; in particular, little 
attention has been given to how men perceive their body image (Dolan et. al 1987; 
Grogan 2016). Some studies suggest that body image disturbance, in fact, occurs 
both in individuals with and without AN (e.g. Dolan et. al 1987; Hennighausen et al 
1999). This is additionally complicated when we take in account research done by 
Lee (1991, 2001) that indicates that Asian women with AN do not suffer from 
distorted body image, leading her to conclude that “DBI is a controversial entity that 
may be obvious, mild, latent or absent” (1991, p.708). 
This is not to say that we must dismiss body image distortion as having no 
role in AN; rather, the point is to emphasise that “research results are rather 
inconsistent and the true nature of body image disturbance is still not very well 
understood” (Skrzypek et al. 2001, p.220). As such, we should be hesitant to commit 
to conceptions of AN based principally upon this notion. 
What is more, when we privilege distorted body image as a way of 
understanding the bodily experience of AN, we implicitly privilege an understanding 
that conceives of AN as a ‘disease of thinness’. The implication is that because 
individuals with AN have distorted body image and overestimate the size of their 
bodies, they enter into a ritual of self-starvation in order to reach a lower, ideal shape 
or weight. However, as Legrand (2014, p.186) highlights “a description of anorexia 
which focuses on low body weight and disturbed body representation does not make 
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sense from the patient’s perspective, in her world, but only in the objective and 
objectifying world of the psychiatrist”.  
Why has thinness has come to occupy centre stage when addressing AN? 
One reason might be that the thinness of patients with AN is the aspect of the 
disorder that is available to the third-person perspective; thus, coming to stand as 
the visual marker of the pathology. A fixation on thinness is generated through the 
privileging of the outsider’s gaze. Lee (2001) also highlights that this fascination with 
thinness is culturally valanced, as this emphasis on thinness, while dominating 
Western discussions of AN, is largely missing in Asian societies.  
Warin (2004, p.95) suggests that it is the fascination with thinness which leads 
us to ignore “the profound embodied sensations of power and suffering that are 
central to experiences of anorexia”. Conceptualising AN on the basis of what is 
available to the third-person perspective risks leaving aside “the subject as she 
experiences her body here and now” (Legrand 2010a, p.729) and leaving us with an 
incomplete picture of bodily experience in AN.iv 
This seems particularly problematic when we consider descriptions of bodily 
experience of AN that are at odds with models that posit thinness and distorted body 
image as central features. Statements such as the following make it clear that the 
lived experience of AN goes beyond a striving for thinness or a fear of fatness: “Yes, 
there are days when I “feel fat,” but this mostly translates to “I feel stressed.” 
Somehow, they got linked in my mind (stress– >fat–>eat less–>less stress), but that 
doesn’t mean the driver is for me to be thin; the driver is for me to be calm, and 
thinness was the result” (Arnold in Legrand 2014). Other reports explicitly undermine 
the distorted body image approach: “I did not think I was too fat; quite the contrary. 
There was a skeleton peering at me from behind the looking glass” (Halban 2009, 
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p.184); as well as evidence that some individuals with AN take satisfaction in their 
emaciated bodies.  
The focus on thinness and distorted body image seems to be made at the 
expense of listening to subjective experiences of AN. Those with AN often do not 
mention the pursuit of thinness as the only, nor even sometimes the primary, 
motivating factor during the early stages of AN. Commonly expressed are themes of 
control, self-preservation and bodily distrust (e.g. Halban 2009; Hornbacher 1999; 
MacSween 1993; accounts reported in Legrand 2010, Warin 2004, 2010). As 
Hornbacher expresses it:  
[S]hrinks have been paying way too much attention to the end result of eating 
disorders...This end result is not your intention at the outset. Your intention 
was to become superhuman, skin thick as steel, unflinching in the face of 
adversity. (Hornbacher 1999, p.68)  
The risk of focusing predominantly upon thinness is that it gives rise to the 
impression that AN is a form of radical dieting gone wrong resulting from a 
misperception or misjudgement of one’s body size or shape.  
It should also be highlighted that the distorted body image approach, like 
many other accounts, tends towards depicting AN as a static disorder (Warin 2004, 
p.98). By focusing upon the emaciated patient who is subject to obsessive thoughts 
about food and her body, we are prone to forget that AN is not just a pathology in the 
end stages, when someone is really thin. As I shall explore, the experience of a 
patient with AN might start out as one thing ‘at the outset’ and then transform into 
another by the ‘end result’. Note that I am not suggesting that individuals with AN 
never talk about thinness and weight-size, clearly they do (e.g. reports in Charland et 
al. 2013). However, we need to show sensitivity to what stage reports of AN are 
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being documented at. As discussed in section 4, individuals with AN often 
experience increased obsession with food and thinness as the disorder progresses. 
If reports are taken during this stage, while individuals are in the throes of such 
obsessive thoughts and feelings, this does not necessarily reflect bodily experience 
and concerns during earlier stages of AN. 
This is all to say that focusing on distorted body image risks overshadowing 
other aspects of bodily experience in AN. When studying AN, a bodily pathology, it 
seems remiss to not fully explore bodily experience of those suffering from the 
disorder. As such, in this paper, I follow researchers such as Bowden (2012), 
Charland et al. (2013), and Legrand (2010a, b) in placing the affective, bodily 
experience of individuals with AN front and centre in my analysis of AN.  
 
2. Lived bodily experience of AN 
For the purposes of this paper, I draw primarily upon Marya Hornbacher’s book 
Wasted, which provides a detailed account of her battle with AN, as my source of 
experience of the body in AN. It should be noted, however, that Hornbacher’s 
descriptions of AN are not exhaustive of the disorder. Therefore, her account should 
not be treated as universal. Nevertheless, I suggest that her descriptions of AN as 
involving a desire to assert control over her physical body, of having a deep-rooted 
suspicion of her body and wanting to preserve her sense of self, are reflective of 
numerous other accounts of the disorder (e.g. Bowman 2006; Halban 2009; 
accounts detailed in Bruch 1978 and Warin 2004, 2010).  
In particular, I want to draw attention to the following passages from 
Hornbacher’s account:  
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It is, at the most basic level, a bundle of deadly contradictions; a desire for 
power that strips you of all power. A gesture of strength that divests you of all 
strength. A wish to prove that you need nothing, that you have no human 
hungers, which turns on itself and becomes a searing need for the hunger 
itself. (Hornbacher 1999, p.6)  
Somehow I learned before I could articulate it that the body – my body – was 
dangerous…I did not trust it. It seemed treacherous. I watched it with a wary 
eye. (ibid., p.14)  
I had no patience for my body. I wanted it to go away so that I could be a pure 
mind, a walking brain, admired and acclaimed for my incredible self-control. 
(ibid. p.108) 
Anorexia was my Big Idea, my bid for independence, identity, freedom…You 
don’t just get it, the way you get a cold; you take it into your head, consider it 
as an idea first, play with the behaviours awhile, see if they take root. (ibid, 
p.69) 
In addition to these extracts from Hornbacher’s personal account of AN, it is 
important to add that AN is a disorder of stages. In the early stages, AN is 
experienced as an expression of self-control and strength, a project of 
empowerment. As Warin (2004) notes, this stage is referred to by some as the 
‘honeymoon phase’. However, as AN progresses, there is a reversal; ultimately the 
individual “loses control over the bodily practices that were intended to further the 
experience of greater control” (Duesund & Skårderud 2003, p.56). In the final stages, 
the individual with AN can lose control over her thoughts and actions and thinking 
about food and the body becomes “obsessional” (ibid.).  
Osler. L. (Forthcoming). Controlling the noise: A phenomenological account of Anorexia Nervosa and the 
threatening body, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.  
14 
 
Hornbacher’s descriptions point to an “intolerable tension” (Legrand 2010a, 
p.727) experienced by the individual between the subjective and physical 
dimensions of her lived experience. In particular, Hornbacher describes how she 
experienced her body as something loud, domineering, threatening; something that 
she was unable to trust or block out. Hunger is depicted as something intrusive 
which a person with AN strives to overcome, to refuse to give in to. The act of self-
starvation, rather than simply a pursuit for thinness, is described as an act of 
strength, of self-control.  
This might strike us as somewhat paradoxical; how can an act of self-
destruction be understood as an act of power, an act of self-preservation? I suggest 
that the phenomenology of embodiment, with its multi-dimensional account of the 
body, is able to make sense of this supposed paradox in the following terms: that 
self-starvation is an act of body-control enacted by the body-as-subject over her 
physical body. I will claim that the act of body-control is pursued in order to diminish 
the threat of the objective, visceral body to the body-as-subject. The individual with 
AN, as an act of self-preservation, attempts to control and silence the noisy 
demanding body in search of a radical embodiment as a body-as-subject, freed from 
the demands of the physical body. Capturing self-starvation as a project of control, 
rather than just a project of dieting, helps to do justice to the complex bodily 
experience of AN.  
It should be noted here that the term ‘project’ here is not meant to imply a 
purely cognitive, goal-orientated project that the individual explicitly formulates and 
pursues but as an embodied, affective habitual pattern of behaviours. My notion of 
‘project of control’ could well be characterised using the illuminating framework of 
conceiving of AN as a passion; a felt, affective form of organization that can seep 
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into all corners of an individual’s life, affecting her evaluative frameworks (Charland 
et al. 2013, p.357).v While Charland et al. discuss AN as a passion for thinness, this 
approach is also compatible with the idea that AN can be characterised as a passion 
for control. I will return to this idea in section 4 in relation to how the experience of 
hunger changes, from the individual experiencing it as an intrusive desire of the body 
to a valued sign of success of her taking control of the body’s visceral demands. 
 
3. Three dimensions of bodily experience  
Phenomenological accounts of embodiment provide a detailed description of the 
body as both something physical and subjective. As Husserl (1989) highlights, we do 
not just have a physical body (Körper) but we also are our lived body (Leib); the body 
is a physical object in the world and something subjective, that which we live 
through. In addition to this classical distinction, I also introduce a third, commonly 
overlooked, dimension of bodily experience: Leder’s conception of the visceral body. 
These distinctions highlight the different ways in which we can experience the body, 
not a claim that we have different types of body (Gallagher & Zahavi 2013, p.136).  
With these three dimensions of bodily experience in play, I suggest we can 
start to demystify the seeming paradox of starving oneself as an act of self-
preservation; the individual with AN can be understood as a body-as-subject trying to 
protect her sense of agency and autonomy from the noisy, visceral demands of her 
physical object-body. Self-starvation, then, is not deployed against the whole body 
but against a specific dimension of bodily experience.  
 
3.1. Body-as-object 
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The body is a physical object: it has spatial and temporal location in the world; it has 
colour and texture; it can be measured; it is subject to natural laws. As discussed 
above, it is the body-as-object (Körper) that tends to be of interest to the scientific 
and medical world. We, too, can experience our own bodies as objects. I can use my 
senses to explore my body in a way that I might explore another object in the world.  
Yet, the body-as-object is not experienced in exactly the same way as we 
experience other objects in the world. Imagine leaning your cheek against your hand. 
You can feel your cheek with your hand, perceive it as a smooth physical surface. 
However, when touching a part of your body, the body also feels itself as touched 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012). When my hand touches my cheek, my cheek is not some 
inert object but my cheek; my cheek feels the touch of my hand. My body is not 
experienced as a mere object. The experience of my body-as-object involves 
experiencing it as my body, not as just another object out there in the world. 
Compare this experience of my cheek and my hand to the ring on my finger: when I 
push my hand against my cheek, I can feel my ring pushing against my cheek, but 
my ring cannot feel my cheek, nor do I experience the ring as mine in the same way 
that my cheek is mine. The body-as-object is not, therefore, experienced as totally 
devoid of subjectivity. While the body can be experienced as an object, as something 
that can be perceived, it is not just an object; it is also the body-as-subject, that 
which does the perceiving (Merleau-Ponty 2012). This highlights that the body has a 
unique phenomenological status compared to other objects in the world.  
 
3.2. Body-as-subject 
According to Sartre (2003, p.357), explicitly experiencing the body-as-object is an 
“aberrant type of appearance”. We do not regularly attend to our bodies as objects. 
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When I walk along the street, I am not intentionally directed toward my body-as-
object, to my feet and legs moving, my arms swinging. Instead, I am caught up in my 
aim to get to the bus stop.  
We experience our bodies as the medium through which we have a world. 
The lived body (Leib), the body-as-subject, orientates me in the world; it is the ‘here’ 
from which everything else is experienced as ‘there’. This is not to say that the body 
is a vessel for subjectivity. Rather, “I am my body” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p.151) and 
my body structures my experience of the world. I see my shoelaces as tie-able 
because I have hands with opposable thumbs, I see stairs as climbable as I have 
legs with which to walk up them. The world unfolds itself as a world of possibilities 
that refer to my bodily abilities; the world offers itself up to a bodily “I can” (Merleau-
Ponty 2012). My physical body, therefore, shapes my subjective experience of the 
world. In this way, we can see that the body-as-subject, while experienced differently 
from the body-as-object, is not devoid of all physicality. 
We are not, usually, intentionally directed to our bodies but directed towards 
the world, caught up in our everyday doings. It is part of the character of 
experiencing the body-as-subject that the body-as-object ‘disappears’ into the 
background (Leder 1990). If the body-as-object were constantly at the fore-front of 
my attention, our ability to get caught up in the world would be hindered. Take for 
example going for a walk: if I were directed toward moving my legs, my muscles, 
placing my feet, the whole experience would be clunky and disjointed. That the body-
as-object is absent is precisely what makes walking easy, the disappearance of the 
body-as-object liberates us, allows us to focus on the world (Leder 1990).  
 
3.3. The visceral body  
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There is, though, a third dimension of bodily experience I want to highlight. 
Somewhat ironically, classical phenomenology often downplays that the physical 
body is not an object like cups and chairs but is an organic object, with needs, 
feelings, affectivity. Leder (1990) notes that one area of bodily experience frequently 
overlooked is the visceral body. By the visceral body, Leder is referring to the inner 
body. Leder claims that this is an important aspect of bodily experience because it 
captures how the body-as-object can feature not just as something that shapes the 
body-as-subject or is experienced as an inert object but something that makes 
demands of the body-as-subject.  
Leder captures the demanding nature of the body by giving a 
phenomenological description of the visceral body. He details how, when we are 
hungry for example, the body-as-object does not just call attention to itself as an 
object but makes demands upon the body-as-subject:  
 
I must eat, breathe, excrete, drink, sleep, at certain times in certain ways to 
mollify inner demands. My personal subjectivity can choose to fulfil such 
biological needs, eating one food rather than another. But it does not assert 
final autonomy. I may temporally postpone a meal, but if I engage in 
prolonged self-starvation, this will eventually threaten my life. When the 
personal subject seeks to overcome the vegetative “I must”, it is the subject 
who is ultimately overcome. (Leder 1990, p.48) 
This feature of bodily experience highlights that the body-as-object is not simply 
experienced as some inert object but has its own ‘voice’. These demands are not 
neutral, cold demands but felt, noisy demands, as anyone who has experienced a 
pang of hunger will recognise.  
Osler. L. (Forthcoming). Controlling the noise: A phenomenological account of Anorexia Nervosa and the 
threatening body, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.  
19 
 
This bodily “I must” can, as we will see, come into direct conflict with the 
autonomy of the body-as-subject. The bodily “I must” appears to emerge from a 
“different volitional space” (ibid., p.47), that of the inner body. As we will see below, it 
is this demanding bodily ‘voice’ that the individual experiences (in the early stages of 
the disorder) as a threat to her body-as-subject; the “I must” impacts her, comes 
from her own body, and thus is in some sense her own (I do not, for example, 
mistake my hunger for your hunger, however unwanted that hunger might be), but is 
experienced as outside of her control and as impinging upon her autonomy. Indeed, 
that AN was initially labelled a hysterical illness suggests that the visceral, affective 
experience of the disorder previously received greater attention than perhaps it 
currently does.vi  
 
3.4. Intertwinement, objectification and visceral demands 
The physical and subjective dimensions of the body are usually intertwined (Legrand 
2010a; Moran 2013). As Moran (2013, p.294) highlights we should be careful not to 
“absolutize the contrast between Körper and Leib, since my living body is always 
physical body too”; we should not create a false dichotomy between these aspects of 
bodily experience. The body-as-subject is not solely experienced as subjective but 
as tied to the physical world and the physical body; the body-as-object is not solely 
experienced as physical as it is experienced as mine, as capable of performing the 
switch between perceived and perceiver, but also as alive, with its demands and 
needs. 
Nevertheless, to say that the body-as-object and body-as-subject are 
intertwined is not to say that they are experienced as always being in perfect 
harmony. These different dimensions of bodily experience can come into conflict with 
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one another. When this occurs, we experience a tension between body-as-object 
and body-as-subject (Legrand 2010a, p.727). The classic example of this is when we 
experience pain. Let us return to my going to the bus stop. Initially, while I am 
walking along, I am not directed at my body-as-object, at my feet and legs moving, at 
my arms swinging. Instead I am focused on getting to the bus-stop, planning my day, 
admiring the weather. Then, I suddenly experience a searing pain in my knee and 
my body-as-object is thrown into the foreground. My project of walking to the bus 
stop evaporates and all I am aware of is my knee. In this way, the body-as-object 
disrupts my bodily “I can” and replaces it with a bodily “I can’t” (Leder 1990, p.85). 
The experience of the body-as-object being thrown into the foreground in this way is 
often described as an experience of objectification. According to Leder (1990, p.85), 
this is often accompanied by an experience of the body-as-object as alienated or 
distanced from the body-as-subject.  
Another example of objectification is of Sartre’s description of shame where 
the gaze of the Other brings our body-as-object to the fore. Here our body-as-object 
can be experienced as the centre of attention: I feel the blush creep up my face, feel 
my feet rooted to the ground, feel painfully visible and vulnerable as an object in the 
world (Sartre 2003, p.282). 
In addition to the tension created by objectification, we can also experience 
the visceral body impinging on the realm of the body-as-subject; not by appearing as 
object-like but by demanding action on the part of the subject. Thus, the body-as-
object can be experienced as threatening to the body-as-subject as it compels the 
body-as-subject through its needs. The body-as-subject’s agency and sense of self-
determination may be challenged by such visceral demands, setting the body-as-
subject at cross-purposes with the visceral body. Indeed, we should note that even in 
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the classic examples of objectification, such as pain and shame, to say that we 
experience the body as object-like might be misleading; for we experience the body 
as suffused with the feeling of pain, the feeling of blushing. Even here the body-as-
object is not devoid of all subjectivity or viscerality.  
What these examples illustrate is how a conflict can arise between body-as-
object, body-as-subject and the visceral body in everyday experience. In such 
instances, the physical body stands out to me, thwarts my projects, breaks my 
seamless engagement with the world, makes demands of me. In section 4, I discuss 
how a person with AN does not simply experience a conflict between these 
dimensions of bodily experience but experiences the visceral body’s demands as 
encroaching unbearably upon their subjective autonomy.  
 
4. A phenomenological account of AN 
What do these insights offer a study of AN? As we saw earlier, the individual with AN 
looks to be in a paradoxical situation where (at least in the early stages) she sees 
her self-starvation, an act of self-destruction, as an act of self-preservation. I suggest 
by understanding bodily experience to be made up of multiple dimensions, we can 
make sense of this apparent paradox. I propose that we understand the early stages 
of AN as an attempt to preserve the body-as-subject through an act of bodily control 
over the body-as-object as a visceral body. By attempting to quell the demanding 
‘voice’ of the body-as-object, an individual with AN seeks a radical form of 
embodiment as a body-as-subject, unchallenged and unthreatened by the visceral 
body.  
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In the following, I start by exploring the idea that individuals with AN 
experience their bodies as radically objectified. While this, I think, captures some 
aspects of the disorder, it falls short of capturing that the individual with AN does not 
experience her body as simply object-like but as something noisy, out of control and 
threatening. I argue that we should understand an individual with AN as experiencing 
her body-as-subject as threatened by the visceral demands of the body-as-object 
and, in order to subjugate these demands, embarks upon a project of objectifying the 
body to assert her dominance and power as a body-as-subject.  
Thus, we can conceive of AN not as an attempt to disappear an objectified 
body but as a project of bringing the physical body under the command of the 
subjective one, a project that involves reductively objectifying the body. A project 
that, eventually, reverses, rendering the individual at the beck-and-call of her 
obsessive habits. By bringing in Leder’s visceral body, the account I put forward 
helps us move beyond a static account of AN towards an account which outlines the 
various stages and bodily experiences of AN as the disorder progresses.  
 
4.1. AN as radical objectification 
In section 3, we saw how experiences of objectification involve a conflict between the 
body-as-object and the body-as-subject. Objectification is marked by feelings of the 
body as object-like; its physicality comes to the forefront of the subject’s attention. 
Given that individuals with AN often report feeling their bodies as overly present and 
visible to others, this might seem like a good characterisation of the experience of 
AN. Rather than the experience of the body-as-object being an aberrant way of 
experiencing their bodies, it is their dominant form of bodily experience.  
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Bowden (2012, p.233), for instance, claims that the body in AN is experienced 
in a similar way to how the body is experienced in cases of objectification under the 
gaze of the Other: “In AN, just as with shame, the body is experienced as object-like 
and overly present”. She suggests that because of this objectification, an individual 
with AN does not identify with her body: “the experience of the body is of an extra, 
unwanted appendage, that she is separated from and that seems to be an obstacle 
in her movements” (ibid., p.234). Like in shame, the experience of the body as 
primarily object-like is disruptive to the body-as-subject and its goals. What is more, 
by adopting a reflective stance on one’s body-as-object, such as through body-
checking or mirror-gazing, the individual with AN might be said to contribute to her 
experience of the body primarily as object-like (Legrand 2010a).  
However, the idea that individuals with AN experience their bodies as 
pathologically objectified raises some questions. The most obvious being, what is 
meant by objectification? Unfortunately, this is a term that is often used without 
precise definition. Bowden, for example, talks of objectification in terms of 
experiencing the body as ‘object-like’. Yet, as we have already explored, 
experiencing the body as a physical object in the world is part of normal experience. 
It is possible to experience the body-as-object without experiencing it as devoid of 
subjectivity, or as reducible to merely an object (Legrand & Ravn 2009; Legrand 
2010a; Papadiki 2010). Moreover, experiencing one’s body as object-like is not 
always disruptive or unpleasant; for example, when dancing or when experiencing 
sexual pleasure (Legrand & Ravn 2009). Borrowing Papadiki’s term, these instances 
can be described as “non-reductive objectification” (2010, p.32). 
It appears unlikely that Bowden means objectification in this sense as she is 
claiming that an individual with AN experiences her body as object-like in a 
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problematic manner. It seems, then, that radical objectification is intended as 
“reductive objectification” (Papadiki 2010, 32); objectification through which the body 
is experienced as an object devoid of any degree of subjectivity, as an inert object.  
Yet, describing an individual with AN as experiencing her body as an inert 
object seems to overlook reports of individuals with AN experiencing their bodies as 
dangerous, that they fear the biological urges of their bodies, that they experience 
hunger as a base need. Hornbacher describes her body as being threatening, as 
something that needs to be controlled, and of her aim to overcome the physical 
desires and needs of her body. This is not a picture of the body as something inert, 
that simply gets in the way of the body-as-subject, but as something that places 
demands on the subject. These descriptions match descriptions not just of the body-
as-object but of its visceral dimension in particular. On Hornbacher’s account, it 
seems that experiencing the body as demanding and threatening is what prompts 
the individual with AN to pursue self-starvation. This hints at the idea that she does 
not simply experience her body as objectified but embarks upon a project of 
objectifying the body, via self-starvation, in order to silence the demands of the 
visceral body.  
Additionally, the radical objectification approach, as it is currently articulated, 
also risks presenting a static account of AN which fails to do justice to the 
development of the disorder. For example, it is not clear from Bowden’s paper if she 
intends to make a distinction between experience of AN in the early and later stages 
of AN nor whether radical objectification is a constant feature of AN or not. I suggest 
that we can enrich the account of how an individual with AN experiences her body by 
building in Leder’s conception of the visceral body.  
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4.2. AN as radical bodily-control 
What Leder’s account of the visceral body highlights is that the body-as-object can 
feature in experience as directly challenging the body-as-subject’s autonomy. This 
threat does not involve the body being experienced simply as an inert object, rather it 
emerges from a tension between the autonomy of the body-as-subject and the inner 
demands of the visceral body.  
The threatening demands of the body are reflected in reports of individuals 
with AN in relation to their experience of hunger: “The enemy of anorexic control is 
appetite. Appetite is the chaos which makes discipline so necessary; appetite is the 
danger from which ritualised eating tries to protect the self” (MacSween 1993, 
p.194). Indeed, Hornbacher explicitly states that AN is an attempt to prove that you 
have no human hunger or needs.  
What is more, this is paired with the fact that AN often takes root at times of 
bodily upheaval such as stress or at the onset of puberty, when the body’s voice is at 
its loudest (and arguably at its least inert): “My body, which I felt unruly to begin with, 
suddenly did what I always feared it would do; it defected, without my permission, 
and without warning, my body began to “bloom”” (Hornbacher 1999, p.40). The 
visceral body does not only intrude on the body-as-subject through experiences of 
hunger, but also through uncomfortable, negative feelings that the individual 
experiences as outside her control, e.g. stress, shame, bodily changes during 
puberty and menopause. This visceral clamouring of disruptive and intrusive feelings 
leads the individual not to experience their body as simply an object but as noisily 
making demands from the body-as-subject and challenging the body-as-subject's 
autonomy.  
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By introducing the notion of the visceral body, we can capture how the 
physical body threatens the body-as-subject. What leads to the ‘dis-ease’ at the 
onset of AN is precisely that the body-as-object is not simply experienced as object-
like, inert and controllable. Instead, the unpredictability of the body-as-object, its 
demanding “I must”, is experienced as threatening the body-as-subject. Self-
starvation, then, is the “magic solution” (Lester 1997, p.487). By refusing to give in to 
the visceral body’s invasive demands, the body-as-subject reasserts control. 
Moreover, by asserting control over this visceral dimension of the body-as-object, by 
denying the autonomy of the body-as-object, we can conceive of the individual with 
AN as attempting to reduce the body-as-object to its purely physical, object-like 
dimensions. Therefore, the act of self-starvation itself can be understood as an 
objectifying act in the sense that it diminishes the threatening demands of the body.  
Note that self-starvation does not simply get rid of the demand for food. 
Rather, the individual with AN takes control over that hunger; she dictates how and 
what the body feels. Hunger is experienced as a result of the body-as-subject’s 
refusal to eat (at least in the earlier stages of AN). Instead of experiencing hunger as 
a challenging voice, hunger becomes an affirmation of the individual’s own power 
over her visceral body. The very meaning of hunger is transformed, where hunger is 
no longer experienced as negatively valenced but as a felt reward (cf. Gillet 2009). 
The body-as-subject, therefore, exerts control over the visceral body, transforming its 
threatening demands into a validation of the subject’s successful project of self-
starvation. As Charland et al (2013) argue, the project of AN becomes a filter through 
which the individual interprets her world. Hunger takes on a new meaning in this 
evaluative framework as a sign of felt success.  
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Moreover, by turning attention to the self-inflicted feeling of starvation, other 
feelings (such as stress, shame, and other negative emotions) fade into the 
background.vii Thus, the visceral dimension of the body-as-object is robbed of its 
clamouring voice, allowing the body-as-subject to experience full agency. This also 
captures why thinness might not be the main goal but is still valued; thinness, in this 
project of bodily control, becomes a sign of success, visual proof of the body-as-self 
overcoming the demands of the body-as-object.  
The individual with AN ‘co-opts’ the voice of the visceral body, making it her 
own. In this way, she overcomes the body-as-object’s demanding and threatening 
nature, turning it into an object over which she has control. What this approach 
captures is that the individual with AN does not simply experience being alienated 
from her own body but that the project of self-starvation aims to reconcile the deep-
felt conflict between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object's visceral 
dimensions. Starvation is not an attempt to get rid of the body, but to bring the 
physical body into line; for the quiet body-as-object can disappear into the 
background as she seamlessly engages with the world as a body-as-subject - a 
“walking brain”, as Hornbacher (1999, 108) puts it. If the individual with AN were to 
experience a complete separation between herself and her body-as-object, we might 
expect symptoms that more closely match that of depersonalisation, where an 
individual denies that their body belongs to them anymore, rather than the tension 
experienced by individuals with AN.  
By taking over the demands of the visceral body and rendering them an 
affirmation of the body-as-subject’s own power, we can understand how AN is “most 
particularly in the early phases, experienced as a productive and empowering state” 
(Warin 2004, p.101). If we construe AN as a passive experience of objectification, 
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something that just happens to the subject, this feeling of empowerment seems 
unwarranted. By placing objectification in the hands of the individual subject we 
capture how self-starvation is an act of bodily control exercised by the person 
herself.  
As emphasised in section 2, this project of control need not be conceived of in 
terms of a cognitive, cold project but rather as a habitual, pre-reflective set of 
embodied practices that the individual with AN adopts in response to the intolerable 
tension she experiences between her body-as-subject and body-as-object. These 
practices of control can also be supported, driven and scaffolded by the world 
around her. For instance, “developing complex, excessively intricate eating rituals 
(supported by various artifacts and technologies) intended to slow down the eating 
process and minimize consumption; regularly inhabiting online spaces (pro-anorexic 
websites, blogs, social media, or chat groups; image-blogging platforms like 
Instagram and Tumblr) for tips, strategies, inspiration, or emotional support” (Krueger 
& Osler forthcoming, p.5). Self-starvation, then, becomes a habitual way of being-in-
the-world, supported by her world. That this project of control is not simply a faulty 
belief or set of judgements has important therapeutic implications as I shall explore 
below.  
However, the project of reductively objectifying the body involves attending to 
the body-as-object constantly. The individual with AN continuously monitors her 
bodily sensations (feeling her hunger, for example) - as Hornbacher notes, she starts 
to need hunger. She also compulsively scrutinizes and weighs herself. This self-
monitoring does not lead to the body-as-subject seamlessly engaging with the world 
but obsessively turning her gaze to her body-as-object. As such, in attempting to 
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take control of the body-as-object's visceral threats, she exactly prevents her body-
as-object smoothly disappearing into the background.  
While the project of radical body-control might start out as an attempt to 
control the demands of the body-as-object, AN is often marked by a reversal of this 
situation. Ultimately, her magical solution betrays her; “[t]he individual’s use of 
dieting, exercise, and the like to exert control, to stabilize identity and security, lead 
precisely to a destabilization of these as the illness progresses” (Leder 2013, p.93). 
These practices become habitualised and sedimented in her way of being-in-the-
world.  
As AN progresses, the starving body reasserts its own control, leading the 
patient with AN to fixate on thoughts of food and the body. Consequently, “the 
original goal of the self-project [is] lost in a mire of obsession and apparently 
“irrational” fears” (Lester 1997, p.487). The sad irony embedded in AN is that the 
project of objectification, which at first liberates the body-as-subject from the 
demands of the visceral body, comes to constrain the subject even further. The 
hunger, which the individual feared and then valued, becomes all-consuming; it is 
constantly felt, constantly attended to, and dictates how the individual with AN 
engages with the world. Her world collapses into a world that entirely circles around 
her body-as-object and obsessive thoughts of food; her project of control, of 
empowerment, eventually disempowers her. 
If the idea of self-starvation as a bodily project of control has some traction, I 
suggest that we can conceive of the lived experience of AN as broadly progressing 
along the following lines: 
i. The individual experiences the tension between body-as-object and body-as-
subject, which is part of normal embodied experience, as intolerable. The 
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body-as-object is experienced as threatening, not simply because it is object-
like, but because of the demands of the visceral body. It makes demands of 
the individual with AN, constantly reminding her she is under its control, 
hindering her easy engagement with the world as a body-as-subject.  
 
ii. In an effort to control the body-as-object, and thus preserve the autonomy of 
the body-as-subject, the individual with AN refuses to eat. Self-starvation 
involves denying the visceral needs of the body-as-object and taking control 
of what the body feels.  In the early stages, she experiences self-starvation 
and her reductive objectification of the body-as-object as empowering. While 
the body-as-object is not silenced, sensations such as hunger are 
experienced not as invasive commands of the body-as-object but as an 
affirmation of the body-as-subject’s successful project. Additionally, other 
troubling feelings are drowned out by the constant ebb of hunger. By robbing 
the body-as-subject of its voice, the individual with AN attempts to reduce the 
body-as-object to the status of inert object. 
 
iii. However, the project of objectification contains the seeds of its own 
destruction. As the body is increasingly experienced as object-like, for 
instance through constant self-monitoring, the individual with AN loses her 
ability to engage with the world through her body-as-subject and feels 
increasingly alienated from her body and the world. Moreover, the ritualised 
practices of her project of self-starvation (such as food rituals, body-checking 
and body-weighing, constantly thinking about calorie intake) themselves 
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become habitual; rather than being an project that she is in control of, the 
project becomes her normal, inflexible way of being-in-the-world.  
 
iv. Finally, the starved body reasserts its own control, reducing the individual to 
obsessive thoughts of food and the body, rendering her out of control.  
Note that these steps are not intended to be clear-cut; people can progress through 
some (and not all) of these stages, go through periods with and without self-
starvation, and, crucially, some may experience other aspects of the disorder as 
more prevalent than those I have highlighted here. However, what I have attempted 
to do here is do justice to the common experience of AN as a project of bodily 
control.  
Based upon the classic distinctions found in phenomenology of embodiment, 
as well as Leder’s conception of the visceral body, the seemingly paradoxical project 
of self-destruction as self-preservation can be reconceived as a project of control 
enacted by a body-as-subject over a threatening body-as-object. This seems to do 
justice to the first-person reports of AN as a bid for control and strength. Moreover, 
by focusing upon lived experience of the individual with AN, the account can present 
AN as a disorder of stages; this means AN can be understood as a project of control 
that eventually leads to the patient losing control, without falling into contradiction.  
 
4.3. A note on the (dis)embodied self 
It might strike some that Hornbacher’s description of AN might well be taken as 
showing that the individual seeks to destroy her physical body entirely in order to 
reach a purely disembodied mind; that the attitude of those with AN is marked by a 
radical Cartesianism (e.g. Bordo 1992; Bruch 1978). Such a reading renders the 
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phenomenological distinction between body-as-object and body-as-subject 
unnecessary for analysing AN.  
While this theory of disembodiment might initially seem promising, as it 
captures how the individual with AN privileges her subjectivity over her physicality, I 
do not think that it can adequately capture the nature of the conflict in AN. As 
discussed throughout this paper, the individual with AN does not appear to 
experience her body as something totally devoid of subjectivity. Quite the contrary, it 
is the experience of the body-as-object as having an autonomous voice, demands 
and needs which disrupts the individual’s experience as body-as-subject that seems 
to be the source of the tension. As Lester concisely puts it, it seems that “anorexia 
springs from the all-too-painful realization that I am my body” (1997, p.485). 
Indeed, the individual with AN is consumed with thoughts about her body, she 
finds it suspicious, treats it as a threat to her sense of self. I suggest that it is 
precisely because the physical body is experienced as her body, as part of her self, 
that it can pose such a threat. Only by experiencing her physical body as hers can 
she experience it as encroaching on her subjectivity. On the same reasoning, it 
seems that the self that she experiences as being threatened is a bodily-self, 
otherwise the workings of the physical body would not be seen as somehow 
intruding upon the subjective realm; only a bodily-self can be threatened by a bodily-
object. As such, I suggest that the experience and conflict of AN must play out on the 
stage of bodily experience. 
Moreover, if we treat the individual with AN as seeking disembodiment 
through the destruction of the physical body, it is perplexing why the early stages of 
AN give rise to the feelings of empowerment, strength and control. Instead, we would 
expect this sense of empowerment to increase as the individual’s body wastes away, 
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becomes closer to ‘disappearing’. Yet, this experience of empowerment and 
strength, though marking the early ‘honeymoon’ stage, seems to evaporate as the 
individual becomes subject to obsessive thoughts about food and the body. As I 
have emphasised, what individuals with AN are attempting to disappear is the body’s 
noisy, disruptive demands, not the body as a whole.  
 
5. Therapeutic implications 
Providing a detailed account of the lived experience of bodily experience in AN has 
certain implications for treatment. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is the most 
widely used form of therapy for psychiatric disorders (Škodlar et al. 2013) and is 
often used to treat patients with AN. CBT is a top-down approach that seeks to 
reconfigure faulty or disruptive thoughts, beliefs and judgements. The thought being 
that if one can identify the ‘faulty’ thinking of a patient, this can be readdressed 
cognitively. We can see how the CBT model fits with an understanding of AN based 
upon distorted body image, for it might seem well-suited for targeting and addressing 
misjudgements or misperceptions about body image, weight, shape or size. 
However, if, as I have argued, taking distorted body image as the central 
characteristic of AN results in other key aspects of bodily experience to be left to one 
side, then therapy orientated around righting a distorted body image may fail to deal 
with the crux of the disorder.  
While I am not denying that CBT may work well for some individuals with AN, 
there is a concern that this cognitive approach leaves aside the lived bodily 
dynamics of the patient. In this paper, I have highlighted how the distrust and dis-
ease with her material body arises out of a felt conflict between the needs of the 
visceral body and the autonomy and agency of the body-as-subject. The individual’s 
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need to assert control over her material body does not arise from a false belief, faulty 
thinking or a misjudgement about her body but from a deeply felt, affective disruption 
at the level of her bodily experience. As Charland et al. (2013, p. 361) point out, “the 
cognitive lens through which so much mental disorder is seen may be distorting our 
perspective too much toward beliefs and rational analysis, at the expense of the 
affective aspects”. 
If we understand AN as involving a disruption in bodily experience, then 
therapy which attempts to alter the patient’s bodily dynamics may well be 
appropriate. Body-orientated therapy that attempts to reharmonize the individual’s 
body-as-subject, body-as-object and visceral body is a bottom-up approach that 
addresses the bodily disturbance of AN. Maiese (2016) describes bottom-up therapy 
as “centering on bodily engagement in such a way that it shifts bodily dynamics and 
feelings, so as to allow not only for significant changes in cognition and patterns of 
thought, but also for significant changes in embodied affect and emotion” (p. 235).  
Body-orientated therapeutic techniques include, among others, dance 
therapy, movement therapy, yoga therapy, music therapy and animal therapy, and 
have been suggested for the treatment of multiple disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Maiese 2016), depression (Michalak et al. 2012) and autism (Krueger & Maiese 
2018). However, given that obsessive exercise to control weight is a classic 
symptom of AN, particular care must be taken when recommending exercise-based 
treatment for individuals with AN. Such treatment should, perhaps, focus on how the 
body feels during gentle movement and not encourage over-exertion. Yoga, for 
instance, has been used effectively in treatment of schizophrenia as a method of 
restoring “bodily attunement, so that their sense of ownership and agency begin to 
be reinstated” (Maiese 2016, 241). If AN is marked by a clash between different 
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dimensions of bodily experience, such body-orientated therapies may help 
reintegrate these dimensions in the AN patient’s experience. Through gentle 
movement, individuals can be encouraged to use their bodies in a way that does not 
reductively objectify them but allows the objective body to be experienced either as 
something pleasurable (Legrand & Ravn 2009) or as something that can smoothly 
disappear into the background (Leder 2013). 
In addition to recognising the lived bodily dynamics of those with AN, if, as I  
have suggested, the project of controlling the noisy body is also supported, driven 
and scaffolded by the individual’s world, therapeutic interventions should also be 
sensitive not only to the patient’s lived bodily experience but also to how her 
environment and habits contribute to the disorder. Looking beyond the cognitive 
beliefs and judgements of such patients allows for more holistic, and potentially more 
sustainable, forms of treatment.   
Treatment that attempts to ‘normalize’ bodily experience must be sensitive to 
what the patient’s current bodily experience actually is. As I have shown, the bodily 
experience changes at different stages of AN. Depending on what stage the 
particular individual is at is likely to affect what treatment is appropriate and effective. 
Therapeutic approaches should, then, be sensitive to the temporality of AN and 
accommodate this into treatment plans. This applies not only at the moment of 
diagnosis but involves recognising that different treatment methods may be 
necessary at different stages of the treatment process.  
Given the emphasis I have placed on AN as a bodily project of control, when 
considering therapeutic methods, we should also raise the question of how 
individuals with AN should be involved in their own recovery. As Carter et al. (2004) 
note, patients with AN are rarely consulted about what they expect or what they want 
Osler. L. (Forthcoming). Controlling the noise: A phenomenological account of Anorexia Nervosa and the 
threatening body, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.  
36 
 
from therapy. Many therapeutic approaches involve subjecting patients to a strict 
regime of eating, weight gain and constant measurement. If we see AN as a 
desperate grapple for bodily self-control, then this style of therapy should strike us as 
counter-productive; it threatens to place the individual as not just a slave to her 
bodily drives but to other people as well. Tan et al. (2010) detail how “patients with 
anorexia nervosa reported considerable experience of compulsion and restriction of 
choice” (p.18) even when formal, compulsory treatment was not being administered, 
as well as highlighting that most participants “thought that going through treatment 
and achieving recovery required some degree of consent and cooperation” (p.16). 
Moreover, the constant measuring of her body, which incidentally mirrors the 
patient’s own body monitoring behaviour, might add to her experience of her body-
as-object as objectified. Such approaches, therefore, might contribute to, rather than 
solve, the problem at the root of the disorder.  
 
Conclusion  
Rather than primarily approaching bodily experience of AN in terms of distorted body 
image, a phenomenological approach to AN offers an understanding of AN that does 
greater justice to the bodily experience of individuals with AN. By introducing the 
distinction made in the phenomenology of embodiment between the body-as-subject, 
the body-as-object and the visceral body, I have suggested that we can conceive of 
an individual’s self-starvation, an act of self-destruction, as an act of self-
preservation; the individual seeks to control the visceral body through self-starvation, 
an act of the body-as-subject.  
While the different bodily dimensions can come into conflict with one another 
in everyday experience, especially in instances of objectification and in relation to the 
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body’s visceral demands, the individual with AN does not just experience this as a 
tension but as an unbearable encroachment of the body-as-object into the subjective 
realm of the body-as-subject. Based on this view, I have presented the idea that the 
individual does not simply experience her body as objectified but embarks upon a 
project of reductively objectifying the body, via self-starvation, in order to take control 
over the demands of the visceral body.  
This project of bodily control is embarked upon with the aim of being able to 
smoothly engage with the world as body-as-subject, where the body-as-object fades 
into the background. However, in carrying out the project (and seeking signs of her 
success), she is subject to constant hunger, to compulsive body-monitoring and 
obsessive thoughts about food. Thus, the project of AN, the individual's bid for 
power, ultimately robs her of power as she becomes uncontrollably obsessed with 
food and her body, rendering her body-as-object as more salient, rather than less so.  
I want to end by re-emphasising that this account of AN as a project of bodily 
control, that progresses through various stages, is not offered as an exhaustive 
account. Many other factors come into play and, as a result of focusing in on the 
themes of control, self-preservation and hunger, I have downplayed other aspects of 
the experience of AN. In particular, while I have placed control at the centre of my 
account, I have focused upon how the individual experiences her body’s visceral 
nature as disruptive to her sense of autonomy and said next-to-nothing about how 
others come into the picture. As discussed in section 3, Sartre highlights how the 
gaze of others can also lead to us experiencing ourselves as vulnerable and subject 
to others. When this occurs, Sartre describes how we not only experience ourselves 
as a body-as-object but also as a body-for-others. This feeling of being subject to the 
other’s gaze is another way in which an individual with AN may experience her body 
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as outside of her control (see Legrand & Briend 2015). Indeed, Englebert et al. 
(2018) suggest that one way in which individuals with AN seek to avoid having 
control exerted over them by others, is to adopt food-practices where they are in 
control of providing food for others, thus ensuring they are not submitted to external 
command and vulnerability. There are, then, additional aspects of the experience of 
AN that relate to experiences of being out of control and additional behavioural 
patterns adopted to reassert a sense of control. Developing these intersubjective 
aspects would complement and greatly enrich the account I have put forward here.viii  
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i There is also a broader epistemic point here to be considered about which reports 
of AN should be believed. Addressing this concern, though important, goes beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
ii Due to the high prevalence of AN in women, I will use the pronoun ‘her’ throughout 
this paper.  
iii This focus on disturbed body image also permeates discussions of bulimia (see 
Cash & Brown 1987, Cash & Pruzinsky 2004) and muscle dysmorphia (e.g. Pope et 
al. 1997). 
 
iv This emphasis on measurable symptoms might not be unique to AN. Carel (2016) 
argues that illness is chiefly approached from the point of view of the doctor. 
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v Thank you to the blind reviewer who helpfully drew my attention to Charland et al.’s 
complementary framework.  
vi Thank you to the blind reviewer who brought this point to my attention.  
 
vii It might be profitable to compare self-starvation to self-harm, which also uses the 
infliction of a deliberate intense sensation (i.e. pain) to block out uncomfortable and 
uncontrollable feelings.  
viii Thank you to the blind reviewer who brought highlighted the role of intersubjectivity 
in AN. 
